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Abstract
We consider anonymous games with a Lebesgue space of players in
which either the action space or players’ characteristics are denumer-
able. Our main result shows that the set of equilibrium distributions
over actions coincides with the set of distributions induced by equilib-
rium strategies.
This result, together with Mas-Colell (1984)’s theorem, implies
that any continuous, denumerable game has an equilibrium strategy.
In particular, the theorems of Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath,
and Sun (1997) can be obtained as corollaries of Mas-Colell’s.
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1 Introduction
Based on the work of Hildenbrand (1974) and Hart, Hildenbrand, and Kohlberg
(1974), Mas-Colell (1984) formulated the equilibrium notion of large anony-
mous games in terms of distributions. In this way, he departed from the usual
formalization of an equilibrium as a strategy, i.e., as a measurable function
from players into actions. This allowed him to obtain an existence theorem
easily and under general conditions.
Since an equilibrium distribution is a probability distribution over char-
acteristics and actions, it does not tell us what actions does each player takes
in an equilibrium. Rather, and loosely, it tells us only the fraction of players
with a certain characteristic that play a certain action. This is obviously in
contrast with equilibrium strategies. Motivated by this, and despite the ease
and generality that Mas-Colell’s approach allows, researchers still investigate
properties of equilibrium strategies (see the recent survey by Khan and Sun
(2002)).
It is clear that the two approaches are related. In the concrete case of
a game described by a measurable function from players into characteristics
(i.e., payoff functions), this function together with an equilibrium strategy
induces an equilibrium distribution of the game. In particular, this observa-
tion implies that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions — defined
as the set of marginal distributions over the space of actions obtained from
the equilibrium distributions — contains the set of distributions induced by
equilibrium strategies. It also implies that each theorem establishing the
existence of an equilibrium strategy also establishes the existence of an equi-
librium distribution. This potential for extra generality accounts for the
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attractiveness of posing the existence problem in anonymous games with a
continuum of players in terms of distributions.
In fact, Mas-Colell’s theorem relies on strictly weaker assumptions than
those of the known results on the existence of equilibrium strategies in games
defined on the unit interval, which are stated in Schmeidler (1973), Rath
(1992), Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997). Despite this
extra generality, is it the case that these existence theorems can be obtained
as corollaries of Mas-Colell’s?
We show that, with the exception of Schmeidler’s and Rath’s theorems,
Mas-Colell’s implies all the others. We establish this relationship by showing
that the set of equilibrium distributions over actions coincides with the set of
distributions induced by equilibrium strategies in denumerable games. De-
numerable games are games with either a denumerable action space or with
denumerably many characteristics. Hence, since Khan and Sun’s theorem
applies only to games with denumerably many actions, it is then implied by
Mas-Colell’s together with our main result.
Furthermore, we show, as corollaries to Mas-Colell’s theorem, that an
equilibrium distribution exists for any game in the class considered by Khan,
Rath, and Sun (1997).1 When the action space is denumerable, our main
result then implies Theorems 1 to 3 of Kahn, Rath and Sun. More generally,
it shows that an equilibrium strategy exists for all denumerable games in this
1These are games in which each player’s payoff depends only on his choice and on the
average choice of the others and the action space is a (non-necessarily denumerable) subset
of either a separable Banach space with the weak topology, a separable Banach space with
the norm topology, a dual space of a separable Banach space with the weak* topology or
R∞ (in this last case, only games with countably many actions will be considered).
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class.
An important consequence of our results is that it yields a general exis-
tence theorem for equilibrium strategies in games with an uncountable ac-
tion space. Thus, in contrast to the view expressed in Khan, Rath, and Sun
(1997), it is possible to extend the equilibrium theory for anonymous games
beyond the case of denumerable action space. The extension we present
requires, however, that players’ characteristics be denumerable. Hence, our
results stress the importance of denumerability assumptions for the existence
of equilibrium strategies in games with a continuum of players, highlighted
in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), but they show that those assumptions can
be imposed either on the action space or on players’ characteristics.
In fact, the examples of Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) show that our main
result does not extent beyond denumerable games. In their examples, the
set of distributions induced by equilibrium strategies is empty, while the
set of equilibrium distributions over actions is not. It is this dependence on
countability assumptions that prevents us from obtaining Schmeidler (1973)’s
theorem on the existence of equilibrium strategies for games with a convex,
compact subset of a euclidian space. It, therefore, also prevents us from
obtaining Rath (1992)’s generalization of Schmeidler’s theorem.
Besides extending Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997)’s
results by allowing uncountable action spaces in games with denumerably
many characteristics, we find our approach to be conceptually simpler. It
amounts simply to asking when we can obtain an equilibrium strategy from
an equilibrium distribution, whose existence is guaranteed by Mas-Colell’s
Theorem. That is, we divide the existence question into two related ones:
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first, we ask when an equilibrium distribution might exist, the answer to
which is given to us by Mas-Colell’s theorem. Then, we ask if an equilibrium
distribution over actions can be purified (or represented) by an equilibrium
strategy. Our main result provides an answer to this question.
A recent and fruitful approach to the existence question in non-atomic
games is the the one of Khan and Sun (1999), who consider games on a Loeb
space of players. Although we also find Mas-Colell’s distributional approach
simpler than theirs, because it relies exclusively on standard methods, it
seems that Khan and Sun’s approach allows for additional generality. In
fact, Khan and Sun’s Theorem 1 implies Mas-Colell’s existence theorem.
However, it is unknown whether or not Mas-Colell’s theorem implies Khan
and Sun’s. As noted by Khan and Sun (1999, p. 474), Mas-Colell’s theorem
is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium strategy in games on a hyperfi-
nite Loeb counting space, but the argument that establishes this equivalence
does not seem to extend to the case of a general Loeb space. Our approach
can be useful in answering this question: If our main result holds in games
on a Loeb space of players, then the equivalence between Mas-Colell’s and
Khan and Sun’s theorems would be established.
Apart from the question of additional generality, Mas-Colell’s theorem
is also useful to relate several known existence results. In addition to the
ones we have already mentioned, we have shown in Carmona (2005) that
Mas-Colell’s theorem is equivalent to the existence of an approximate equi-
librium in all sufficiently large equicontinuous games (i.e., games in which
players’ characteristics form an equicontinuous family).2 These relations are
2There, we also show that both these results are equivalent to Khan and Sun (1999)’s
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summarized in Figure 1.
We conclude this section with a remark on the proofs of our results.
Although different, our approach in games with denumerably many actions
is, nevertheless, quite close to the one used by Khan and Sun (1995). Here,
as there, the main tool is the Bolloba´s and Varopoulos’s Theorem. Thus, our
approach relies on their insight into the importance of this theorem for the
theory of large games. The results regarding games with denumerably many
characteristics are new and rely on a simple modification of Skorokhod’s
Theorem (see Skorokhod (1956)).
2 Notation and Definitions
Let A be a non-empty, complete and separable metric space of actions en-
dowed with its Borel σ – algebra and M(A) be the set of Borel proba-
bility measures on A endowed with the weak convergence topology. By
Parthasarathy (1967, Theorems II.6.2 and II.6.5), it follows that M(A) is
a complete, separable metric space. Let U be a metric space of utility func-
tions u : A ×M(A) → R endowed with its Borel σ – algebra. The set U
represents the space of players’ characteristics.
A game with a continuum of players is characterized by a measurable
function U : [0, 1] → U , where the unit interval [0, 1] is endowed with the
Lebesgue measure λ on the Lebesgue measurable sets and represents the set
of players. We represent such game by G = (([0, 1], λ), U,A). A game G has
denumerably many characteristics if U([0, 1]) is a denumerable subset of U . A
asymptotic theorems.
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game G has denumerably many actions if A is denumerable. Finally, a game
is denumerable if it has either denumerably many actions or characteristics.
Let Uc denote the space of continuous utility functions u : A×M(A)→ R
endowed with the supremum norm; it is a complete, separable metric space.
A game G is continuous if A is compact and U = Uc.
Given a Borel probability measure τ on U × A, we denote by τU and τA
the marginals of τ on U and A respectively. The expression u(a, τ) ≥ u(A, τ)
means u(a, τ) ≥ u(a′, τ) for all a′ ∈ A.
Given a game G with a continuum of players, a Borel probability measure
τ on U × A is an equilibrium distribution for G if
1. τU = λ ◦ U−1, and
2. τ({(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τA) ≥ u(A, τA)}) = 1.
We will use the following notation: Bτ = {(u, a) ∈ U × A : u(a, τA) ≥
u(A, τA)}. For a general game G with a continuum of players, an implicit
requirement for τ to be an equilibrium distribution is that Bτ is measurable.
Note that if G is continuous, then Bτ is closed, and so a Borel set; hence
τ(Bτ ) is well defined for all distributions τ ∈M(Uc × A).
A pure strategy is a measurable function f : [0, 1] → A. A pure strategy
f is a Nash equilibrium of G if
U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1].
Mas-Colell (1984)’s Theorem 1 asserts the existence of an equilibrium
distribution in games with a continuum of players.
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Theorem 1 (Mas-Colell) An equilibrium distribution exists for all contin-
uous games.
In the following sections, we will show how Theorem 1 implies the exis-
tence of a Nash equilibrium in continuous, denumerable games.
3 Denumerable Games
In this section, we present our main result. LetG be a game with a continuum
of players and let D(G) be the set of equilibrium distributions over actions.
Formally,
D(G) = {τA ∈M(A) : τ is an equilibrium distribution of G}.
Also, let D(G) be the set of distributions over actions induced by equilibrium
strategies:
D(G) = {λ ◦ f−1 : f is a Nash equilibrium of G}.
It is clear that for any game G, denumerable or not, we have that D(G) ⊆
D(G). This follows simply from the fact that if f is a Nash equilibrium of
G and τ denotes λ ◦ (U, f)−1, then τA belongs to D(G). In general, the
inclusion is strict as it can be seen from the first example in Khan, Rath,
and Sun (1997). However, if G is denumerable, then they coincide.
Theorem 2 If G is a denumerable game, then D(G) = D(G).
Theorem 2 follows from Theorems 3 and 4 below. We can interpret it as
showing that for denumerable games there is no loss of generality by focusing
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on equilibrium strategies. That is, all equilibrium behavior is captured by
equilibrium strategies.
Although interesting in its own right, Theorem 2 has an important con-
sequence when applied to continuous games. If G is a continuous game,
then, by Mas-Colell (1984, Theorem 1), G has an equilibrium distribution τ .
Moreover, if G is also a denumerable game, then τA = λ◦f−1 and f is a Nash
equilibrium of G. Therefore, G has a Nash equilibrium. Thus, Theorem 2
implies the existence of Nash equilibria for continuous, denumerable games
with a continuum of players.
Corollary 1 A Nash equilibrium exists for all continuous, denumerable games.
3.1 Games with Denumerably Many Actions
In this subsection we consider games with denumerable action spaces. The
following purification result establishes part of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 Let G be a game with denumerably many actions. If τ is an
equilibrium distribution of G, then there exists a Nash equilibrium f : [0, 1]→
A such that τA = λ ◦ f−1.
The idea of the proof is to partition the set of players into as many sets
as the number of actions available and then use this partition (which is in a
one-to-one correspondence with the action space) to define the equilibrium
strategy. This partition must satisfy two properties: the set of players playing
action a must be a subset of those for whom a is a best-reply and its measure
must equal τA({a}). The existence of such partition is guaranteed by the
Bolloba´s and Varopoulos’s theorem as stated in Khan and Sun (1995).
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As a consequence of Theorem 3 and Mas-Colell’s Theorem, we obtain
Khan and Sun (1995)’s existence result (see their Theorem 10):
Corollary 2 (Khan and Sun) A Nash equilibrium exists for all continu-
ous games with denumerably many actions.
3.2 Games with Denumerably Many Characteristics
Finally, we turn to games with denumerably many characteristics. For games
in this class, we obtain a stronger representation theorem.
Theorem 4 Let G be a game with denumerably many characteristics. If
τ is an equilibrium distribution of G, then there exists a Nash equilibrium
f : [0, 1]→ A such that τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1.
Clearly, Theorem 4 implies the remaining part of Theorem 2, but it says
more: for games with denumerably many characteristics, the set of equilib-
rium distributions coincides with the set of distributions induced by Nash
equilibria and the function U describing the game.
The idea of its proof is simple: we define as many probability measures
over the action space as the number of possible characteristics. Each such
measure describes the distribution of choices made by players with a given
characteristic. A modified version of Skorokhod (1956)’s theorem allows us
to represent any such measure by a function defined on the set of players with
the corresponding characteristic. Then, it is easy to see that these functions
define the equilibrium strategy.
Theorem 4 implies part of Corollary 1. That is, it implies that any contin-
uous game with denumerably many characteristics has a Nash equilibrium.
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We emphasize that for this result, the action space can be uncountable. In
this way, it is the first result on the existence of an equilibrium strategy when
the action space is just a compact metric space.
4 Games based on the Average of Individual
Choices
4.1 Bochner Integral with the Weak Topology
In this subsection, assume that A is a weakly compact subset of a separable
Banach space X. Let co(A) denote the closed convex hull of A, which is
also weakly compact (see Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 11, p. 51)). It
follows from Dunford and Schwartz (1957, Theorem V.6.3, p. 434) that both
A and co(A) are metrizable. Note that the identity function i : A → A is µ
– Bochner integrable and that
∫
A
idµ belongs to co(A) for every µ ∈M(A).
Finally, let Uw be the space of weakly continuous real-valued functions on
A× co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
We define a class Gw of games with a continuum of players as follows:
A game G in Gw is described by (([0, 1], λ), U, A) where U : [0, 1] → Uw is
measurable.
An equilibrium distribution for G ∈ Gw is a Borel probability measure τ
on Uw × A satisfying
1. τUw = λ ◦ U−1, and
2. τ({(u, a) ∈ Uw × A : u(a,
∫
A
idτA) ≥ u(A,
∫
A
idτA)}) = 1,
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where the integral
∫
A
idτA is a Bochner integral. A pure strategy f is a Nash
equilibrium of G if
U(t)
(
f(t),
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
≥ U(t)
(
A,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1].
As a consequence of Mas-Colell’s theorem and of Theorem 2, we obtain
the following existence result.
Corollary 3 An equilibrium distribution exists for all games G ∈ Gw. Fur-
thermore, if G is denumerable, then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Note that when G is a game with denumerably many actions, Corollary
3 corresponds to Theorem 2 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997).
4.2 Bochner Integral with the Norm Topology
In this subsection, assume that A is a norm compact of a separable Banach
space B. Then, co(A) is also norm compact (see Diestel and Uhl (1977,
Theorem 12, p. 51)). We let Un be the space of norm continuous real-valued
functions on A× co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
Finally, we let Gn be the class of games defined as in Subsection 4.1, except
that now players’ payoff functions belong to Un (and A is norm compact).
As in Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), Corollary 3 also applies to the case
of norm compact action spaces. Note that A is weakly compact. Thus, since
norm continuous functions on norm compact sets are weakly continuous, we
obtain the following existence result.
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Corollary 4 An equilibrium distribution exists for all games G ∈ Gn. Fur-
thermore, if G is denumerable, then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Similarly to what happened in the previous section, Corollary 4 corre-
sponds to Corollary 1 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997) when G is a game
with denumerably many actions.
4.3 Gel’fand Integral
In this subsection, let X∗ be the dual of a separable Banach space X and
assume that A is a weak* compact subset of X∗. Then, co(A) is also weak*
compact. It follows from Rudin (1971, Theorem 3.16, p. 70) that both A
and co(A) are metrizable. Note that the identity function i : A → A is µ –
Gel’fand integrable and that
∫
A
idµ belongs to co(A) for every µ ∈ M(A).
Finally, let Ug be the space of weak* continuous real-valued functions on
A× co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
We define a class Gg of games with a continuum of players as follows:
A game G in Gg is described by (([0, 1], λ), U, A) where U : [0, 1] → Ug is
measurable.
An equilibrium distribution for G ∈ Gg is a Borel probability measure τ
on Ug × A satisfying
1. τUg = λ ◦ U−1, and
2. τ({(u, a) ∈ Ug × A : u(a,
∫
A
idτA) ≥ u(A,
∫
A
idτA)}) = 1,
where the integral
∫
A
idτA is a Gel’fand integral. A pure strategy f is a Nash
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equilibrium of G if
U(t)
(
f(t),
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
≥ U(t)
(
A,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1].
For games in this class, we also have the following existence result.
Corollary 5 An equilibrium distribution exists for all games G ∈ Gg. Fur-
thermore, if G is denumerable, then a Nash equilibrium exists.
Corollary 5 corresponds to Theorem 3 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997)
when G is a game with denumerably many actions.
4.4 Games with Denumerably Many Actions in R∞
In this subsection we consider the class of games defined in Section 5 of
Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997). Let R∞ be the space of all real sequences
equipped with the product topology. The standard basis vectors are denoted
by {ei}∞i=1. We let the space of actions be A = {ei}∞i=1. Again, co(A) denotes
the closed convex hull of A, which is equal to the set of all sequences of real
numbers chosen from the closed unit interval. Finally, let U∞ be the space of
continuous real-valued functions on A× co(A) endowed with the sup norm.
We define a class G∞ of games with a continuum of players as follows:
A game G in G∞ is described by (([0, 1], λ), U,A) where U : [0, 1] → U∞ is
measurable.
The following definitions are from Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997). If (T, T , ν)
is a probability space, then a function f : T → R∞ is measurable if f−1({ei}) ∈
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T . In this case, ∫
T
fdν =
∞∑
i=1
eiν(f
−1({ei})).
In particular, if µ ∈M(A), then ∫
A
idµ =
∑∞
i=1 eiµ({ei}) and so we trivially
obtain the following change of variable formula:∫
T
fdν =
∫
A
idν ◦ f−1.
Furthermore, if j ∈ N and pij : R∞ → R is the projection onto the jth
coordinate, then pij is a simple function and its Lebesgue integral is
∫
A
pijdµ =
µ({ej}).
An equilibrium distribution for G ∈ G∞ is a Borel probability measure τ
on U∞ × A satisfying
1. τU∞ = λ ◦ U−1, and
2. τ({(u, a) ∈ U∞ × A : u(a,
∫
A
idτA) ≥ u(A,
∫
A
idτA)}) = 1.
A pure strategy f is a Nash equilibrium of G if
U(t)
(
f(t),
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
≥ U(t)
(
A,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1].
Using both Corollary 1 and Mas-Colell’s theorem, we can provide an
alternative proof of Theorem 1 by Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997).
Corollary 6 (Kahn, Rath and Sun) A Nash equilibrium exists for all games
G ∈ G∞.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we focus on three aspects of the theory of anonymous games
with a continuum of players:
1. The relationship between the set of equilibrium distributions over ac-
tions and the set of distributions induced by Nash equilibria,
2. the existence of Nash equilibria in games with a compact action space
and
3. the place of Mas-Colell’s theorem in this theory.
Regarding the first issue, our main result (Theorem 2) shows that the
two sets are equal in denumerable games. This implies that there is no gain
in considering distributions for analyzing such games; in fact, equilibrium
behavior is completely described by Nash equilibrium strategies.
Combining our main result with Mas-Colell’s theorem, we obtain the ex-
istence of a Nash equilibrium strategy in continuous, denumerable games
(Corollary 1). In particular, Corollary 1 yields, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first general existence theorem for large games with an arbitrarily
compact metric space of actions.
We emphasize that our existence result, as well as those by Khan and Sun
(1995) and Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997), follows directly from Mas-Colell’s.
This gives Mas-Colell’s theorem a central place in the equilibrium theory of
large games.
The importance of Mas-Colell’s result is also highlighted by its unifying
role. In fact, it allows us to relate many of the known results on the equi-
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librium theory of anonymous games, including both the cases of non-atomic
and large finite games (see Figure 1).
We stress that two existence results are missing in Figure 1: those of
Schmeidler (1973) and Rath (1992) for games defined on the unit interval.
While it is clear that Rath’s theorem implies Schmeidler’s, it is unknown to
us how each of them relates to the others listed in Figure 1, which is why
they have been omitted the figure. It is also unknown whether Mas-Colell’s
theorem is equivalent to Kahn and Sun’s on the existence of an equilibrium
strategy in games on a general Loeb space. These are the main questions
that this paper leaves open.
These questions can, however, be addressed as we did in this paper: we
can ask whether the set of equilibrium distributions (denoted by D(G)) is
equal to the set of distributions induced by Nash equilibria (denoted by
D(G)) in the class of games considered by Schmeidler (1973), Rath (1992)
and Khan and Sun (1999). Actually, in the case of the first two, we can
simply ask whether the set I(G) = {∫
A
idµ : µ ∈ D(A)} is equal to I(G) =
{∫
A
idµ : µ ∈ D(A)}. An affirmative answer to either one of these questions
would imply that those results are also a corollary of Mas-Colell’s.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Let G be a game with denumerably many actions and τ be an equilibrium
distribution of G. Note first that
τ(C) = τ(Bτ ∩ C) (1)
for all measurable subsets C of U × A. This follows because τ(Bτ ) = 1.
Let A = {ai}∞i=1. For all i ∈ N define
Ti = U
−1({u ∈ U : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ})
and
τi = τA({ai}).
Since the set {u ∈ U : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ} is measurable (see Aliprantis and Border
(1999, Lemma 4.45, p. 148)), it follows that so is Ti for all i ∈ N.
Let I be a finite subset of N. Then,
λ(∪i∈ITi) = λ(U−1(∪i∈I{u ∈ U : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ}))
= τU(∪i∈I{u ∈ U : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ})
= τ(∪i∈I({u ∈ U : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ} × A))
Also,
∑
i∈I τi =
∑
i∈I
τ(U × {ai})
= τ(∪i∈I(U × {ai}))
= τ(Bτ ∩ (∪i∈I(U × {ai})).
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Since
∪i∈I({u ∈ U : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ} × A) ⊆ Bτ ∩ (∪i∈I(U × {ai}),
it follows that
λ(∪i∈ITi) ≥
∑
i∈I
τi.
Hence, by the Theorem of Bolloba´s and Varopoulos (see Khan and Sun (1995,
Theorem 4)), there exists a pairwise disjoint family {Si}∞i=1 where Si is mea-
surable, Si ⊆ Ti and λ(Si) = τi for all i ∈ N.
Let t ∈ [0, 1]. Define f(t) = ai if t ∈ Si and arbitrarily if t ∈ [0, 1] \
(∪∞i=1Si). Since λ(∪∞i=1Si) =
∑∞
i=1 τA({ai}) = 1, then f is measurable.
Note that λ ◦ f−1({ai}) = λ(Si) = τi = τA({ai}), which implies that
λ ◦ f−1 = τA.
Finally, we show that f is a Nash equilibrium. Let i ∈ N and t ∈ Si.
Since Si ⊆ Ti = U−1({u : (u, ai) ∈ Bτ}), then
U(t)(ai, τA) ≥ U(t)(A, τA).
We have that f(t) = ai and λ ◦ f−1 = τA; hence,
U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1).
In conclusion, U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1) for all t ∈ ∪∞i=1Si and
since λ(∪∞i=1Si) = 1, it follows that f is a Nash equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Let G a be game with denumerably many characteristics and τ be an equi-
librium distribution of G. We claim that there exists a measurable function
f : [0, 1]→ A such that τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1.
20
The proof of the above claim is as follows: Let U([0, 1]) = {ui}∞i=1. For
each i ∈ N, let Ti = U−1({ui}), ci = λ(Ti) and, if ci > 0, λi(E) = λ(E)/ci
for all measurable subsets E of Ti. Furthermore, again if ci > 0, define
τi(D) = τ({ui}×D)/ci for all measurable subsets D of A. Then, there exists
a measurable function fi : Ti → A such that τi = λi ◦ f−1i .3
Define f : [0, 1] → A by f(t) = fi(t) if t ∈ Ti and ci > 0, while if t ∈
[0, 1]\(∪i:ci>0Ti), we define f(t) arbitrarily. Note that λ([0, 1]\(∪i:ci>0Ti)) = 0
and so f is measurable.
Let B be a measurable subset of U ×A and define Bi = {a ∈ A : (ui, a) ∈
B} for all i ∈ N. Note that {ui}×Bi = ({ui}×A)∩B and so, in particular,
{ui} × Bi is measurable. Also, note that τ(B) = τ((U([0, 1])× A) ∩ B) and
λ ◦ (U, f)−1(B) = λ ◦ (U, f)−1((U([0, 1])× A) ∩B). Then,
τ(B) = τ((U([0, 1])× A) ∩B)
=
∑
i
τ({ui} × Bi)
=
∑
i
ciτi(Bi)
=
∑
i
ciλi ◦ f−1i (Bi).
(2)
3The existence of such fi can be obtained by appropriately modifying the proof of
Skorokhod (1956, Theorem 3.1.1, p. 281). We need only to redefine the sets ∆i1,...,ik ,
which will be of the form Ti intersected with an interval. The continuity of the functions
c 7→ λ(Ti ∩ [a, c])/ci and c 7→ λ(Ti ∩ (a, c])/ci for all a ∈ [0, 1], allows for λi(∆i1,...,ik) =
τi(Si1,...,ik), where Si1,...,ik are as in Skorokhod’s proof.
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Also,
λ ◦ (U, f)−1(B) = λ({t ∈ [0, 1] : (U(t), f(t)) ∈ B})
=
∑
i
λ({t ∈ [0, 1] : U(t) = ui and f(t) ∈ Bi})
=
∑
i
λ({t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ Bi})
=
∑
i
ciλi({t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ Bi})
=
∑
i
ciλi ◦ f−1i (Bi).
(3)
Thus, it follows that τ = λ ◦ (U, f)−1.
To finish the argument, we claim that f is a Nash equilibrium of G. For
notational convenience let h = (U, f). We have
h−1(Bτ ) = {t ∈ [0, 1] : (U(t), f(t)) ∈ Bτ}
= {t ∈ [0, 1] : U(t)(f(t), τA) ≥ U(t)(A, τA)}
= {t ∈ [0, 1] : U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1)}.
(4)
Since τ = λ ◦ h−1 is an equilibrium distribution, then λ(h−1(Bτ )) = 1 and so
λ({t ∈ [0, 1] : U(t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ U(t)(A, λ ◦ f−1)}) = 1. Thus, f is a Nash
equilibrium.
A.3 Lemmata for Corollary 3
In this subsection X denotes a separable Banach space and A a weakly
compact subset of X. If a sequence {xk}∞k=1 converges to x in X with respect
to the weak topology, we write xk →w x. If µ ∈ M(A) and (T, T , ν) is
a measure space, in order to avoid any confusion, we say that a function
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f : T → X is strongly µ – measurable when f is µ – measurable as defined
in Diestel and Uhl (1977).
Lemma 1 Let A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space and
µ ∈ M(A). Then, the identity function i : A→ A is µ – Bochner integrable
and
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A).
Proof. Let k ∈ N. Since X is separable, there exists a countable set
{xj}∞j=1 ⊆ X such that X ⊆ ∪∞j=1B1/k(xj) and so A ⊆ ∪∞j=1B1/k(xj). Define
B1 = B1/k(x1) and Bj = B1/k(xj) \
(∪j−1l=1B1/k(xl)). Let Jk ≥ k be such that∑∞
j=Jk+1
µ(Bj) < 1/k. Then, define ik by ik(x) = xj if x ∈ Bj with j ≤ Jk
and ik(x) = x1 otherwise. Clearly, ik : A → A is a simple function for all
k and limk ||ik(x) − i(x)|| = 0 for all x ∈ A. The last fact follows since if
x ∈ Bj, then ||ik(x) − i(x)|| ≤ 1/k for all k ≥ j. Thus, i is strongly µ –
measurable.
Furthermore, since A is bounded, let M be such that ||x|| ≤ M for all
x ∈ A. Thus, ∫
A
||i||dµ ≤M <∞. This implies that i is Bochner integrable
by Diestel and Uhl (1977, Theorem 2, p. 45).
Finally,
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A) by Diestel and Uhl (1977, Corollary 8, p. 48).
Lemma 2 Let A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space and
µ ∈M(A). If {µk}k ⊆M(A) is such that µk ⇒ µ, then
∫
A
idµk →w
∫
A
idµ.
Proof. Let Λ ∈ X∗. Then, Λ : X → R is weakly continuous and so∫
A
Λdµk →
∫
A
Λdµ. Then, by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 11.44, p.
420) (which is a particular case of Hille’s Theorem stated in Diestel and Uhl
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(1977, Theorem 6, p. 47)), it follows that
Λ
(∫
A
idµk
)
=
∫
A
Λ ◦ idµk =
∫
A
Λdµk →∫
A
Λdµ =
∫
A
Λ ◦ idµ = Λ
(∫
A
idµ
)
.
(5)
Thus,
∫
A
idµk converges weakly to
∫
A
idµ.
Lemma 3 Let A be a weakly compact subset of a separable Banach space
and x ∈ co(A). Then, there exists µ ∈M(A) such that x = ∫
A
idµ.
Proof. Let x ∈ co(A) = co(A) (by Dunford and Schwartz (1957, Lemma
V.2.4 (ii), p. 415)) and let {xk}∞k=1 ⊆ co(A) be such that xk →w x. Let
k ∈ N. Then, xk =
∑m
j=1 λjxj for some {xj} ⊆ A and {λj}j with λj ≥ 0 and∑
j λj = 1. Define µk by letting µk({xj}) = λj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m. It follows
that xk =
∫
A
idµk.
Since M(A) is compact, we may assume that {µk}k converges. Let µ =
limk µk. Then,
∫
A
idµk →w
∫
A
idµ. Since xk =
∫
A
idµk, then also
∫
A
idµk →w
x and so x =
∫
A
idµ.
Lemma 4 Let f : [0, 1] → A be measurable and g : A → A be λ ◦ f−1 –
Bochner integrable. Then,∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 =
∫
[0,1]
g ◦ fdλ.
Proof. Consider first the case in which g is simple and g =
∑n
i=1 aiχAi .
In this case, then f ◦ g is also simple with g ◦ f =∑ni=1 aiχf−1(Ai). Then, it
follows that ∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 =
∫
[0,1]
g ◦ fdλ =
n∑
i=1
aiλ(f
−1(Ai)).
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We turn to the general case. Since g is λ◦f−1 – Bochner integrable, there
exists a sequence {gn} of simple functions such that ||gn − g|| → 0 almost
everywhere,
∫
A
||gn − g||dλ ◦ f−1 → 0 and∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 = lim
n
∫
A
gndλ ◦ f−1.
Let Z ⊆ A be such that λ◦f−1(Z) = 0 and ||gn(a)−g(a)|| → 0 for all a ∈
Zc. Then, W = f−1(Z) is such that λ(W ) = 0 and ||gn ◦f(t)− g ◦f(t)|| → 0
for all t ∈ W c. Thus, ||gn ◦ f − g ◦ f || → 0 almost everywhere, and since
gn ◦ f is simple, it follows that g ◦ f is strongly λ ◦ f−1 – measurable.
Furthermore, since A is bounded, then ||gn◦f−g◦f || is also bounded, and
it follows from the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem that
∫
[0,1]
||gn ◦
f − g ◦ f ||dλ→ 0. Hence, g ◦ f is λ ◦ f−1 – Bochner integrable and∫
[0,1]
g ◦ fdλ = lim
n
∫
[0,1]
gn ◦ fdλ.
Furthermore,∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 = lim
n
∫
A
gndλ ◦ f−1 = lim
n
∫
[0,1]
gn ◦ fdλ,
since gn ◦ f is simple. This clearly implies that
∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 = ∫
[0,1]
g ◦ fdλ.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 3
Let W : Uw → Uc be defined by
W (u)(a, µ) = u
(
a,
∫
A
idµ
)
(6)
for all x ∈ A and µ ∈M(A). Since, by Lemma 1, i is µ – Bochner integrable
and
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A) for all µ, thenW is well defined. Furthermore, by Lemma
2, W (u) ∈ Uc.
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Lemma 5 The function W is injective and continuous.
Proof. Let u, v ∈ Uw be such that W (u) = W (v). Let x ∈ A, z ∈ co(A)
and µ ∈M(A) be such that z = ∫
A
idµ. Since W (u) = W (v), it follows that
u(x, z) = u
(
x,
∫
A
idµ
)
= W (u)(x, µ) = W (v)(x, µ) = v(x, z).
Thus, u = v. So, W is injective.
We next show that W is continuous. Let u ∈ Uw and {uk}k ⊆ Uw be such
that uk → u. Then, for all a ∈ A and µ ∈M(A),
|W (uk)(a, µ)−W (u)(a, µ)| =
∣∣∣∣uk (a, ∫
A
idµ
)
− u
(
a,
∫
A
idµ
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ||uk − u||,
(7)
and so ||W (uk)−W (u)|| ≤ ||uk − u||. This shows that W (uk)→ W (u) and
so W is continuous.
Define V : [0, 1] → Uc by V = W ◦ U . Since W is continuous, then V is
measurable. Thus, (([0, 1], λ), V, A) defines a game GV with a continuum of
players. By Theorem 1, there exists an equilibrium distribution τ of GV .
Since W is injective, define g : W (Uw)→ Uw by g = W−1.
Lemma 6 The function g is continuous and V −1(g−1(B)) = U−1(B) for all
subsets B of Uw.
Proof. Let v ∈ U and {vk}k ⊆ U be such that vk → v. Let x ∈ A and
z ∈ co(A) be given and let µ ∈M(A) be such that z = ∫
A
idµ. Then,
|g(vk)(x, z)− g(v)(x, z)| =
∣∣∣∣W−1(vk)(x,∫
A
idµ
)
−W−1(v)
(
x,
∫
A
idµ
)∣∣∣∣
= |vk(x, µ)− v(x, µ)| ≤ ||vk − v||,
(8)
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and so ||g(vk)− g(v)|| ≤ ||vk − v||. This shows that g(vk)→ g(v) and so g is
continuous.
Let B ⊆ Uw. Since V ([0, 1]) ⊆ W (Uw) and W−1 ◦W equals the identity
in Uw, then g ◦ V = W−1 ◦ V = W−1 ◦W ◦ U = U . Hence, V −1(g−1(B)) =
(g ◦ V )−1(B) = U−1(B).
We state the following lemma for later use.
Lemma 7 For all Borel subsets B of A, then τ(Uc ×B) = τ(W (Uw)×B).
Proof. Note first that
τ(W (Uw)× A) = τUc(W (Uw)) =
= λ(V −1(W (Uw)))
= λ(U−1(Uw))
= λ([0, 1]) = 1.
This implies that τ((W (Uw)× A)c) = 0.
Hence,
τ(Uc ×B) =
τ((Uc ×B) ∩ (W (Uw)× A)) + τ((Uc ×B) ∩ (W (Uw)× A)c) =
τ(W (Uw)×B).
Define h : W (Uw) × A → Uw × A by h = (g, i). Then, h is clearly
measurable. Define µ ∈M(Uw × A) by
µ(B) = τ(h−1(B)) (9)
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for all Borel subsets B of Uw × A.
Then, µUw = λ ◦ U−1 since for all Borel measurable subsets B ⊆ Uw we
have that
µUw(B) = µ(B × A) = τ(h−1(B × A)) = τ(f−1(B)× A) =
τUc(f
−1(B)) = λ ◦ V −1(f−1(B)) = λ ◦ U−1(B).
(10)
Furthermore, µA = τA since for all Borel measurable subsets B of A we
have that
µA(B) = µ(Uw ×B) = τ(W (Uw)×B) = τ(Uc ×B) = τA(B). (11)
Finally, we claim that
µ
({
(u, a) ∈ Uw × A : u
(
a,
∫
A
idµA
)
≥ u
(
A,
∫
A
idµA
)})
= 1.
Let
Bµ =
{
(u, a) ∈ Uw × A : u
(
a,
∫
A
idµA
)
≥ u
(
A,
∫
A
idµA
)}
.
Since µ(Bµ) = τ(h
−1(Bµ)), it is enough to show that h−1(Bµ) = Bτ . This
follows since
h−1(Bµ) = {(v, x) ∈ Uc × A : (f(v), x) ∈ Bµ}
=
{
(v, x) ∈ Uc × A : W−1(v)
(
x,
∫
A
idµA
)
≥ W−1(v)
(
A,
∫
A
idµA
)}
= {(v, x) ∈ Uc × A : v(x, µA) ≥ v(A, µA)}
= {(v, x) ∈ Uc × A : v(x, τA) ≥ v(A, τA)} = Bτ .
(12)
If, in addition, G is denumerable, then GV is also denumerable. Hence,
by Corollary 1, there exists a Nash equilibrium f .
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Therefore,
V (t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ V (t)(A, λ ◦ f−1)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Since V (t) = W ◦ U(t), W (U(t))(a, λ ◦ f−1) =
U(t)
(
a,
∫
A
idλ ◦ f−1) for all a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, 1], and ∫
A
idλ◦f−1 = ∫
[0,1]
fdλ,
it follows that
U(t)
(
f(t),
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
≥ U(t)
(
A,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, f is a Nash equilibrium of G.
A.5 Lemmata for Corollary 5
In this subsection X denotes a separable Banach space, X∗ its dual and A
a weak* compact subset of X∗. If a sequence {x∗k}∞k=1 converges to x∗ in X∗
with respect to the weak* topology, we write x∗k →w∗ x∗.
Lemma 8 Let µ ∈ M(A). Then, the identity function i : A → A is µ –
Gel’fand integrable and
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A).
Proof. Note first that i is weak* measurable. This follows because for all
x ∈ X, the function xi : A→ R defined by xi(a) = a(x) is measurable since
it is weak* continuous. Furthermore, i is Gel’fand integrable by Aliprantis
and Border (1999, 11.51, p.424): since xi is weak* continuous on a weak*
compact set, then there exists M ∈ R such that ||xi(a)|| ≤ B for all a ∈ A,
which in turn implies that xi is integrable for all x ∈ X.
Finally,
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A) by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.53,
p. 424).
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Lemma 9 Let µ ∈ M(A). If {µk}k ⊆ M(A) is such that µk ⇒ µ, then∫
A
idµk →w∗
∫
A
idµ.
Proof. For convenience, let x∗ denote
∫
X
idµ and x∗k denote
∫
A
idµk.
Let x ∈ X. By definition, x∗(x) = ∫
A
xidµ, and similarly for x∗k. Since
xi : A→ R is weak* continuous, then ∫
A
xidµk →
∫
A
xidµ. Since this holds
for all x ∈ X, then x∗k →w∗ x∗.
Lemma 10 Let x ∈ co(A). Then, there exists µ ∈ M(A) such that x =∫
A
idµ.
Lemma 10 can be proven in the same way as Lemma 3.
Lemma 11 Let f : [0, 1] → A be measurable and g : A → A be continuous.
Then, ∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 =
∫
[0,1]
g ◦ fdλ.
Proof. Note first that for all x ∈ X we have that (xg) ◦ f = x(g ◦ f).
Since xg : A→ R is continuous and f is measurable, this implies that x(g◦f)
is measurable for all x ∈ X. Hence, g ◦ f is weak* – measurable.
Let x∗1 =
∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 and x∗2 =
∫
[0,1]
g ◦ fdλ. Then, for all x ∈ X,
x∗1(x) =
∫
A
xgdλ ◦ f−1
=
∫
[0,1]
(xg) ◦ fdλ
=
∫
[0,1]
x(g ◦ f)dλ
= x∗2(x)
by the standard change of variable formula. Hence,
∫
A
gdλ ◦ f−1 = ∫
[0,1]
g ◦
fdλ.
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A.6 Proof of Corollary 5
The proof of Corollary 5 follows the same scheme used in the proof of Corol-
lary 3. Lemmata 8 – 11 imply that all the claims in the proof of Corollary 3
extend to the current setting.
A.7 Lemmata for Corollary 6
Lemma 12 Let µ ∈ M(A). If {µk}k ⊆ M(A) is such that µk ⇒ µ, then∫
A
idµk →
∫
A
idµ. Furthermore,
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A).
Proof. Let j ∈ N. Since pij is continuous, then
µk({ej}) =
∫
A
pijdµk →
∫
A
pijdµ = µ({ej}).
Since the jth coordinate of
∫
A
idµk equals µk({ej}), while that of
∫
A
idµ equals
µ({ej}), it follows that
∫
A
idµk →
∫
A
idµ.
We finally show that
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A). Let {µk}∞k=1 be such that µk ⇒ µ
and µk has finite support for all k. Then,∫
A
idµk =
∑
i:ei∈supp(µk)
eiµk({ei}) ∈ co(A)
and, since
∫
A
idµk →
∫
A
idµ, it follows that
∫
A
idµ ∈ co(A).
Lemma 13 Let x ∈ co(A). Then, there exists µ ∈ M(A) such that x =∫
A
idµ.
Lemma 13 can be proven in the same way as Lemma 3.
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A.8 Proof of Corollary 6
The proof of Corollary 6 follows the same scheme used in the proof of Corol-
lary 3. Again we let W : U∞ → Uc be defined by
W (u)(a, µ) = u
(
a,
∫
A
idµ
)
(13)
for all x ∈ A and µ ∈ M(A). By Lemma 12 W (u) ∈ Uc. Furthermore, we
can show that W is continuous.
One then defines V : [0, 1] → Uc by V = W ◦ U and a game with a
continuum of players GV = (([0, 1], λ), V, A). By Theorem 1, there exists an
equilibrium distribution τ of GV . Since A is countable, it follows by Theorem
3 that there exists a Nash equilibrium f .
Therefore,
V (t)(f(t), λ ◦ f−1) ≥ V (t)(A, λ ◦ f−1)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Since V (t) = W ◦ U(t), W (U(t))(a, λ ◦ f−1) =
U(t)
(
a,
∫
A
idλ ◦ f−1) for all a ∈ A and t ∈ [0, 1], and ∫
A
idλ◦f−1 = ∫
[0,1]
fdλ,
it follows that
U(t)
(
f(t),
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
≥ U(t)
(
A,
∫
[0,1]
fdλ
)
for almost all t ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, f is a Nash equilibrium of G.
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Finite number of Players Continuum of Players
dist Loeb (KS)
↙ ↓
dist c Loeb (KS)
↓
dist eqc (KS/C) ↔ dist (MC)
↓ ↓
dist den (KS/C)
↓
av Bochner eqc (KS/C) av Bochner den (KRS/C)
av Gel’fand eqc (C) av Gel’fand den (KRS/C)
av R∞ eqc, den (C) av R∞ den (KRS/C)
Figure 1: Existence Results
With the exception of Mas-Colell’s (MC), all these results establish the existence of Nash
equilibria. In all of them, action spaces are compact metric spaces and payoff functions
are continuous. The symbol dist stands for games in which the externality is modeled as
a distribution, while av is for those in which it is modeled as an average. The symbol c
stands for counting, den for denumerable games and eqc for equicontinuous games. Finally,
C stands for this paper and for Carmona (2005), KS for Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan
and Sun (1999) and KRS for Khan, Rath, and Sun (1997).
35
